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We build a general equilibrium model that features uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks, search frictions
and an operative labor supply choice along the extensive margin. The model is calibrated to match
the average levels of gross flows across the three labor market states: employment, unemployment,
and non-participation. We use it to study the implications of two kinds of aggregate shocks for the
cyclical behavior of labor market aggregates and flows: shocks to search frictions (the rates of job
finding and job loss) and shocks to the return on the market activity (any factors affecting aggregate
productivity). We find that both kinds of shocks are needed to explain the labor market data, and that
an active labor supply channel is key. A model with friction shocks only, calibrated to match unemployment
fluctuations, accounts for only a small fraction of employment fluctuations and has counterfactual
cyclical predictions for participation.
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The idea that labor supply plays a key role in business cycle ﬂuctuations has been controver-
sial ever since it was put forth by Lucas and Rapping (1969). One recurring challenge—the
explicit consideration of unemployment—was recently revived by Hall (2008) in the context
of modern unemployment theory. He argues that although aggregate models with indivisible
labor (e.g., Hansen (1985)) can generate large ﬂuctuations in employment via labor supply
responses, they are inconsistent with the US evidence that roughly 80% of business cycle ﬂuc-
tuations in employment show up as oﬀsetting changes in unemployment rather than changes
in participation. Hall (2009) consequently proposes a model of the macroeconomy in which
the labor supply margin for employment is not operative by assumption: participation is
exogenously ﬁxed and employment is completely determined by search frictions (job-ﬁnding
and job-loss rates).
In this paper we critically examine the view that empirical evidence on unemployment and
participation implies a minimal role for labor supply in the determination of employment. We
develop a macroeconomic model with a detailed description of the labor market, along with
descriptions of individuals’ saving and working opportunities that are in line with applied
work in consumption and labor studies. We demand of this model to match the main labor-
market facts—the gross ﬂows of workers across the three labor market states (employment,
unemployment, and non-participation)—on average over time.
In order to generate aggregate volatility, we then subject this economy to two types of
aggregate shocks: shocks to search frictions (the rates of job ﬁnding and job loss) and shocks
to the return on the market activity (any factors aﬀecting aggregate productivity). Our
central ﬁndings are threefold: (i) this model provides an excellent account of the business
cycle ﬂuctuations in employment, unemployment and participation, as well as in labor market
2ﬂows; (ii) a model with only shocks to frictions cannot account for the labor market data;
and (iii) the ﬂuctuations in employment are chieﬂy a result of an operative labor supply.
One broad conclusion of our paper, thus, is that it is important to explicitly model par-
ticipation in order to understand the underlying forces that shape labor market ﬂuctuations.
Beyond the speciﬁc ﬁndings that we oﬀer, several other arguments suggest that the par-
ticipation decision ought to be taken seriously. First, even if participation did not change
at all over the business cycle, it is surely important to understand why. The gross ﬂows
are large: many individuals move between participation and non-participation each month,
suggesting that this is surely an operative margin for many individuals. Additionally, there
are many examples in the data of large responses in participation over time at the aggregate
level.1 Second, as we detail later in the paper, the relative constancy of the aggregate par-
ticipation rate hides the fact there are large changes in the ﬂows between participation and
non-participation over the business cycle that turn out to mostly oﬀset each other. Third,
although participation ﬂuctuates relatively little in the US, this is much less true for some
other OECD economies.2 Similarly, the importance of participation ﬂuctuations varies across
demographic groups within the US. To us, these three reasons suggest that it is more reason-
able to consider participation as endogenous, and responsive to economic incentives, rather
than to treat it is exogenously ﬁxed.
There is widespread agreement that a good theory of labor market ﬂuctuations should
have solid microfoundations. Following more than forty years of applied research on labor
market dynamics, we believe that the appropriate microfoundations in this context should
include a theory of gross worker ﬂows among the three labor market states of employment,
1An obvious example is the large secular increase in female participation rates. Other examples include
large declines in participation rates for low-skilled males and for older males (the latter occuring prior to
1995).
2See, for example, Rogerson and Shimer (2010).
3unemployment and non-participation. A key building block of our model of gross ﬂows is a
theory of individual labor supply in the presence of idiosyncratic shocks, trading frictions and
incomplete markets in which preferences embody empirically reasonable income and substitu-
tion eﬀects. Each of these features plays an important role. Idiosyncratic shocks are essential
in accounting for the empirical features of the gross ﬂows data. Trading frictions allow us
to distinguish between the unemployed and the nonparticipants. Incomplete markets rule
out trade in employment lotteries and insurance against idiosyncratic shocks, thereby forcing
individuals to self insure by accumulating assets. While this sort of market incompleteness
has been found to not matter much for some business cycle properties, it is evident from
Gal´ ı et al. (2011) that this feature is important for the cyclical properties of participation.
Many models of unemployment assume linear utility, and hence rule out income eﬀects. It
is well known in the applied business cycle literature that income eﬀects, which are needed
for understanding saving as well as insurance, play an important quantitative role.
The calibration of the basic parameters of our model—preferences, technology, and fric-
tions—so as to be consistent with the average behavior of the US economy follows standard
practice in the modern business cycle literature. The calibration of our aggregate shocks is
designed to “give the model a chance”, as in Kydland and Prescott (1982): the shocks to the
return to market activity and to search frictions are set to generate realistic movements in a
subset of the labor market aggregates. This calibration results in shocks that are in line with
existing literatures. We then examine the economy’s behavior for all of the macroeconomic
variables, including all labor market ﬂows.
Our results imply that Hall’s reasoning is misleading. That is, even if the ﬂuctuations
in search frictions in our model are assumed large enough so as to account for observed
ﬂuctuations in unemployment, labor supply responses signiﬁcantly dampen their eﬀect on
4employment. When it is hard to ﬁnd a job, those workers with a job stay on longer. Thus,
aggregate employment does not fall much at all, participation becomes countercyclical, and
the cyclical ﬂuctuations in participation become large—three features that all are at odds
with the data. The key message is that the presence of an empirically plausible labor supply
response along the extensive margin—plausible in that it can account for average ﬂows—
has important implications for evaluating theories in which labor supply is not necessarily
assigned a large role. Put somewhat diﬀerently, exogenously shutting down the participa-
tion margin hides the fact that such a model contains quantitatively important forces with
counterfactual predictions.
Our ﬁnding that a speciﬁcation with shocks to both the return to market activity and job-
ﬁnding and job-loss rates gives a very reasonable account for all of the cyclical labor market
facts, i.e., for stocks as well as ﬂows, is non-trivial and quite surprising. When we decompose
the resulting ﬂuctuations into the contribution attributed to each shock we ﬁnd that the
dominant source of employment ﬂuctuations is the shock to the return to overall market
activity, whereas the dominant source of unemployment ﬂuctuations is the shock to the job
oﬀer arrival rate. Shocks to the job-loss rate play only a minor role overall. Moreover, shocks
to the job-ﬁnding rate account for much of the ﬂuctuations in measured transition rates from
employment to unemployment. In short, the relative constancy of the participation rate over
the business cycle is not evidence against the importance of labor supply as a driving force
behind aggregate ﬂuctuations.
Given its focus on business cycle ﬂuctuations in an aggregate three state model of the
labor market, our analysis is closely related to recent similar analyses by Tripier (2004),
Veracierto (2008), Gal´ ı et al. (2011), Christiano et al. (2010), Shimer (2011) and Haefke and
5Reiter (2011).3 Relative to these authors, one key distinction of our analysis is its focus on
gross ﬂows. Each of these papers focuses exclusively on the ﬂuctuations in the levels of E,
U and N and pays no attention to the properties of the underlying ﬂows, either in steady
state or over the cycle. Our setting also places stronger emphasis on individual heterogeneity
and the uninsurability of idiosyncratic shocks. Relative to Tripier and Veracierto, we allow
for shocks to labor market frictions. Relative to Shimer (2011), the job-ﬁnding frictions are
assumed exogenous here; thus, we focus on the economy’s response to cyclical variations in
job-ﬁnding and job-loss rates as opposed to on their origins.
An outline of the paper follows. In the next section we document the key business
cycle facts for gross worker ﬂows among the three labor market states for the US over the
period 1968-2009. Section 3 describes our theoretical framework. Section 4 presents our
quantitative results on the eﬀects of diﬀerent aggregate shocks on gross worker ﬂows and
Section 5 concludes.
2 Business Cycle Fluctuations in the Labor Market
The early real business cycle literature focused on a small set of second moments that were
thought to represent ﬁrst order properties of business cycle ﬂuctuations, including the relative
volatility and comovement between aggregate series such as output (Y ), consumption, invest-
ment, and employment. While this has been useful for focusing and organizing quantitative
research on business cycles, we expand the set of labor market statistics considered along two
dimensions in order to better understand and distinguish between the forces that shape labor
market ﬂuctuations. First, as in recent work noted in the introduction, we include informa-
tion on how non-employed workers are categorized between the states of unemployment and
3Alternatively, our model can be viewed as adding search frictions to the model of Chang and Kim (2006),
that features idiosyncratic shocks, indivisible labor and incomplete markets.
6out of the labor force. Second, and diﬀerently than the studies just mentioned, we explicitly
consider the gross ﬂows of workers between states.4 These ﬂows have long been recognized
as important; see, e.g., Blanchard and Diamond (1990). From the perspective of connecting
an aggregate model of the labor market to micro data, we believe the behavior of individual
labor market ﬂows is of ﬁrst order importance.
Table 1 presents data for average monthly transition rates among the three labor mar-
ket states: employment (E), unemployment (U), and not in the labor force (N). Details
regarding data sources and construction are provided in Appendix A.1.
Table 1
US Transition Rates 1968-2009
FROM TO
E U N
E 0.954 0.016 0.030
U 0.270 0.508 0.222
N 0.048 0.027 0.925
The transition rates among all three states are very large. While a large literature has
previously emphasized the high transition rates between E and U, we want to highlight the
large transition rates into and out of the labor force. Each month, more than 7% of the
workers who are out of the labor force will enter the labor force in the subsequent month.
We detail later in the paper that part of the measured transition rates between N and U
may be the result of classiﬁcation error, but even if we focus only on the ﬂow of workers from
N to E, the rate is still almost ﬁve percent per month. The key point is that the decision
to move between participation and non-participation seems an operative margin for a large
number of individuals.
Table 2 presents the richer set of labor market business cycle statistics that we study. Note
4Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005) is a recent paper that studies gross ﬂows in a three state model. Diﬀerently
from us, they assume linear utility and do not consider business cycle ﬂuctuations.
7that u denotes the unemployment rate, U/(E +U), and lfpr is the labor force participation
rate, (E + U)/(E + U + N).
Table 2
Cyclical Properties of US Labor Market Statistics
E u lfpr fEU fEN fUE fUN fNE fNU
std(x)/std(Y ) .68 7.6 .21 5.4 2.0 4.9 3.8 2.7 4.0
corrcoef(x,Y ) .84 −.87 .46 −.82 .33 .78 .78 .64 −.70
corrcoef(x,x−1) .95 .92 .72 .73 .20 .84 .73 .41 .75
Our notational convention is that fij denotes the fraction of workers that moved from
state i in the previous period to state j in the current period. Note that although labor
market data are available at monthly frequency, NIPA data is available only at quarterly
frequency. In order to evaluate the correlation of labor market ﬂows with output we have
generated labor market transition rates at quarterly frequency by setting the quarterly value
equal to the average of the three monthly values within the quarter. To produce business
cycle statistics we then log and HP ﬁlter the data.
Several features are worth noting. First, the transition rates between E and U exhibit
roughly equal volatility, are very persistent and are strongly correlated with the cycle, with
fEU being strongly countercyclical and fUE being strongly procyclical. Second, ﬂuctuations
in the unemployment rate are more than an order of magnitude larger than ﬂuctuations in
the participation rate. The former is strongly countercyclical whereas the latter is weakly
procyclical. It follows that most of the cyclical ﬂuctuations in employment show up as
oﬀsetting changes in unemployment as opposed to changes in participation.
We next turn to some patterns that are less well known.5 Although the stock of non-
participants does not vary that much over the business cycle, the ﬂows between non-participation
5Note that there are some diﬀerences between the statistics that we report here and those that are used
in several studies. For example, Shimer (2005) focuses on the ﬂows into and out of unemployment without
distinguishing whether the workers that enter unemployment come from employment or out of the labor force,
or whether the workers that leave unemployment leave to employment or out of the labor force.
8and the other states exhibit pronounced movements at business cycle frequencies. For ex-
ample, whereas the ﬂuctuations in the participation rate are an order of magnitude smaller
than the ﬂuctuations in the unemployment rate, the ﬂuctuations in the transition rates into
and out of non-participation are of roughly the same order of magnitude as the those in the
much-studied ﬂows between E and U. The cyclicality of the ﬂows between U and N also
exhibits an interesting pattern. Speciﬁcally, the transition rate from U to N has the same
cyclical correlation as the transition rate from U into E, and the transition rate from N into
U has the same cyclical pattern as the transition rate from E into U. That is, both ﬂows
into U have the same cyclical properties, as do both ﬂows out of U.
The transition rate from N into E is strongly procyclical, just as is the transition rate
from U into E, though it is somewhat less volatile. Looking only at these two ﬂows, one
would not be led to infer that the participation rate plays only a minor role in accounting
for employment ﬂuctuations. The reason that the stock of participation does not move more
over the cycle is because of the oﬀsetting eﬀect of an increased U to N transition rate during
good times.
3 Theory
As is standard in the business cycle literature, we consider business cycles as resulting from
aggregate shocks that cause the economy to ﬂuctuate around the steady state equilibrium
that would result in the absence of aggregate shocks. We ﬁrst describe our model.
3.1 Economy
In addition to developing a framework appropriate for the issue at hand, our broader aim
is to provide a realistic description of the main economic events for a household as it goes
through time. We thus formulate a model that arguably captures the key income-relevant
9events for a household and its main vehicles for dealing with these events: it can hold an asset,
although restrictedly, thus being able to insure itself but only to some extent. Importantly,
our speciﬁcation of preferences allows for empirically reasonable income and substitution
eﬀects. One advantage of this approach is that it allows us to build a solid connection with
micro data and the rich set of studies on individuals; we will use this in the calibration of
our model. We believe that our model is the ﬁrst macroeconomic model with these features.
While the model is somewhat minimalist, our earlier work Krusell et al. (2011) shows that
it is capable of accounting for the average behavior of labor market ﬂows, therefore making
it a natural benchmark for an initial quantitative assessment of how frictions interact with
labor supply in the business cycle context.
The economy is populated by a continuum of workers with total mass equal to one. All






where ct ≥ 0 is consumption in period t, et ∈ {0,1} is time devoted to work in period t,
0 < β < 1 is the discount factor and α > 0 is the disutility of work. Individuals are subject
to idiosyncratic shocks that aﬀect the static payoﬀs of working in the market relative to not
working. While many distinct shocks may have this feature, including, for example, shocks
to market opportunities, shocks to home production opportunities, health shocks, family
shocks, preference shocks, etc..., we represent the net eﬀect of all of these shocks as a single
shock, and model it as a shock to the return to market work.6 In particular, letting zt denote
the quantity of labor services that an individual contributes if working, we assume an AR(1)
6Alternatively, we could assume that the only shock is to the disutility of working. Either way, the key
economic mechanism is that the shock serves to change the relative return to working versus not working. In
fact, Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005) model home productivity shocks as the driving force.
10stochastic process in logs:
logzt+1 = ρz logzt + εt+1
where the innovation εt is a mean zero normally distributed random variable with standard
deviation σε. This process is the same for all workers, but realizations are iid across them.
Frictions in the labor market are captured by two exogenous variables: λt and σt, where λ
is the employment opportunity arrival rate and σ is the employment separation rate. These
values are common to all individuals but may ﬂuctuate randomly over time. To understand
how the frictions impact the economy it is useful to think that the economy consists of two
islands: a production island and a non-production island. An individual begins period t on
the production island if et−1 = 1, and otherwise begins on the non-production island. Each
individual on the production island observes the realization of an iid separation shock: with
probability σ the individual is relocated to the non-production island. And each individual
who is now on the non-production island, either because they started the period there or
were relocated there by the separation shock, observes the realization of an iid employment
opportunity shock that with probability λ relocates them to the production island. Given
our timing assumption, an individual who suﬀers the σ shock will not necessarily spend a
period in nonemployment but can be reemployed “instantaneously”.
Once these and the other shocks have been realized, individuals make their labor supply
and consumption decisions, though only individuals on the production island can choose e
equal to 1. An individual on the production island who chooses not to work will then be
relocated to the leisure island at the end of period t and will therefore not have the opportu-
nity to return to the production island until receiving a favorable employment opportunity
shock.






kitdi is aggregate input of capital services and Lt =
R
eitzitdi is aggregate
input of labor services. Zt is a standard technology shock. Output can be used either as
consumption or investment, and capital depreciates at rate δ.
Our setting thus leaves open what underlying factors cause the frictions in job ﬁnding
and job loss, as well as what the underlying sources of productivity ﬂuctuations may be—and
whether there is a connection between these. One way to view our approach is that while
we recognize the diﬃculty for workers of ﬁnding and retaining jobs, and hence accept the
notion of involuntary unemployment, we are for the present purpose— i.e., the evaluation
of the role of labor supply over the cycle—agnostic as to the exact model generating these
frictions.
3.2 Equilibrium
We formulate equilibrium recursively. An individual’s state consists of his or her location at
the time that the labor supply decision needs to be made, the level of asset holdings, and
productivity. The aggregate state will include any information that individuals have and is
useful in forecasting prices. We denote this information by Ω. In this model, Ω includes both
exogenous aggregate shocks (Z, λ, and σ) and the distribution of wealth and labor-market
status across all individuals. Since the notion of recursive competitive equilibrium that we
employ is standard we do not include a formal deﬁnition of the consistency conditions, in
particular for how Ω evolves over time.7 We use the notation Ω′(Ω) to denote this evolu-
7In all essential respects we follow Krusell and Smith (1998). Note that because ﬁrms make zero proﬁts
here, one does not need to consider ﬁrm equity, as in Krusell, Mukoyama, and S ¸ahin (2010), where consumers
consequently have a more demanding portfolio problem.
12tion. We do, however, present detailed information on the Bellman equations for individual
workers.
Let W(k,z,Ω) and N(k,z,Ω) be the maximum values for an individual who works and
does not work, respectively, given that he or she has individual values of (z,k) and the
aggregate state is Ω. Deﬁne V (k,z,Ω) by:
V (k,z,Ω) = max{W(k,z,Ω),N(k,z,Ω)}.
The Bellman equations for W and N are given by:
W(k,z,Ω) = max
c,k′ {log(c)−α+βEz′,Ω′[(1−σ(1−λ))V (k′,z′,Ω′(Ω))+σ(1−λ)N(k′,z′,Ω′(Ω))]}
s.t. c + k′ = r(Ω)k + (1 − τ)w(Ω)z + (1 − δ)k + T(Ω), c ≥ 0, k′ ≥ 0
and
N(k,z,Ω) = max
c,k′ {log(c) + βEz′,Ω′[λV (k′,z′,Ω′(Ω)) + (1 − λ)N(k′,z′,Ω′(Ω))]}
s.t. c + k′ = r(Ω)k + (1 − δ)k + T(Ω), c ≥ 0, k′ ≥ 0.
In these expressions, the expectation with respect to Ω′ refers to the stochastic aggregate
components in Ω next period: next period’s values for Z, λ, and σ. Note that the constraint
k′ ≥ 0 reﬂects that there is no borrowing.
4 Quantitative Analysis
We now begin the quantitative analysis of our model economy, starting with the calibration.
The calibration is of two sorts: we need to select the driving processes for our main business
cycle shocks, Z, λ, and σ, and we need to select the rest of the model parameters. We begin
13with the latter part, which is accomplished by looking at the model’s steady state. Thus,
the basic parameters here are selected to match long run aggregate facts and average labor
market facts: stocks and ﬂows across the three states.
4.1 Steady State Calibration
A key aspect of the steady state calibration procedure is to choose parameters so that the
distribution of workers across the three labor market states and the ﬂows of workers between
states in the steady state equilibrium are similar to their average values over time in the
US economy, that is, to ensure that the calibrated model has the requisite microfoundations.
Oﬃcial statistics divide non-employed workers into the two categories of unemployed and out
of the labor force based primarily on how they answer a question regarding active search in
the previous four weeks. Although our model does not feature a search decision, it can be
mapped into this deﬁnition. Speciﬁcally, if active search is a discrete decision and the cost
of search is very small, the decision to search amounts to asking an individual if he or she
would prefer working to not working.8 Among those individuals in our model who are not
employed in period t, we will label anyone who would prefer to be employed “unemployed”
and anyone who would prefer to not work “out of the labor force”.9
Because the calibration is eﬀectively identical to that in Krusell et al. (2010, 2011),
details are provided in Appendix A.2. Table 3 summarizes the calibrated values and the
8Given evidence from time use data on the amount of time devoted to search, we think it is reasonable to
assume that the cost of active search is very small. An extension of this model to incorporate search costs
is feasible, though it would require signiﬁcantly more computer time. As discussed later in the paper, we
conjecture that if search costs of the size estimated in the literature are allowed, the model would deliver very
similar results to those obtained here.
9In our earlier work we argued that a more natural way to connect the model to the data was to adopt a
more inclusive deﬁnition of unemployment in the data, based on the desire to work rather than active search.
Nonetheless, we found that the broader deﬁnition was not substantively important either in terms of the
features in the data or the ability of the model to account for the data. We revert to the standard deﬁnition
of unemployment in this paper because of the diﬃculty in getting a longer time series for ﬂows between the
states with the broader measure.






Y = .3, E
P = .610, U
E+U = .061,1 + r − δ = 1.041/12,E → E = .954
Parameter Values
θ δ β α ρz σε λ σ τ
.30 .0067 .9967 .61 .9931 .1017 .44 .013 .30
One issue that was not explicitly considered in our earlier work that we want to discuss
here concerns classiﬁcation error. There is strong evidence in the literature (see, e.g., Poterba
and Summers (1986)) that classiﬁcation errors lead to spurious ﬂows, especially between
unemployment and not in the labor force. One strategy for addressing this would be to
try to purge the oﬃcial data of measurement error. Unfortunately, this is not feasible.
The survey that Poterba and Summers used to estimate the extent of classiﬁcation error
on transition rates was discontinued shortly thereafter. Instead, we deal with this issue by
adding some measurement error to the data generated by our model. We provide details
on this procedure in Appendix A.3 and show that with an empirically plausible amount of
measurement error the model does a much better job of matching the ﬂows between U and
N. While classiﬁcation error is important in matching the average behavior of ﬂows in the
data, we show in Appendix A.3 that it is not important for our key ﬁndings about business
cycle ﬂuctuations.
While our calibrated model is able to reproduce the key features of both aggregate facts
and labor market ﬂows in the US economy, we think it is also relevant to note the minimalist
nature of the model. At the aggregate level, the basic structure is that of the standard
one-sector neoclassical growth model. We have not included features such as adjustment
costs that are common in current medium scale DSGE models. At the micro level we have
abstracted from empirically reasonable features such as an interaction between individual
15market productivity and employment status, or interaction between individual productivity
and the two frictional parameters. We have also abstracted from the choice of search intensity.
Note also that we only model frictions as they explicitly inﬂuence movements between non-
employment and employment. That is, we do not explicitly model the process of job-to-job
transitions. To the extent that these occur, they are subsumed into the evolution of the
idiosyncratic shocks to z.
While all of these features could be added to the framework, we have instead opted for
parsimony. Our simple model is able to capture the key features of the average ﬂow data, and
therefore seems a natural starting point for the analysis of aggregate ﬂuctuations in a model
that explicitly models the ﬂows. Incorporating the additional features mentioned above is
something that we leave for future work.
4.2 Business Cycle Analysis
In this section we subject the calibrated steady state model of the previous section to aggre-
gate shocks. While we could subject the model to various sorts of aggregate shocks we will
limit our attention to two types of aggregate shocks. In our steady state model we found
that idiosyncratic shocks to employment opportunities and the beneﬁt of working relative to
not working were suﬃcient to capture average movements of workers across the three labor
market states. Here we will focus on aggregate shocks to these same two factors. We capture
aggregate shocks to the relative value of working versus not working by our TFP shock Zt.
This is obviously a simple way to generate a common increase in the beneﬁt of working rel-
ative to not working. However, to the extent that there are other mechanisms for achieving
this same outcome (e.g., informational shocks coupled with some form of increasing returns
to scale) we do not necessarily insist on the interpretation of this driving force as a true
technological shock. We capture aggregate shocks to frictions through stochastic movements
16in λ and σ. Note that we take the changes in these frictional parameters to be exogenous.
Our goal at this point is to assess the ability of various types of shocks to generate outcomes
that match those found in the data, rather than the analysis of how these shocks arise.
We proceed by considering a sequence of diﬀerent assumptions about the aggregate
shocks. We ﬁrst consider the special case in which labor market frictions are random but
aggregate productivity is not. That section makes precise how the labor supply margin plays
an important role in this economy and how the equilibrium outcome involves counterfactual
behavior for participation. We next shut down the shocks to frictions and instead look at
TFP shocks only. Here as well, the model’s predictions are far from the data in a number
of respects, particularly for both unemployment and worker ﬂows. Finally, we present our
“benchmark”, which is a model with shocks to both frictions and TFP.
The details of how the aggregate shocks are chosen are presented in each section. Prior
to describing our ﬁndings, we also brieﬂy summarize how the model is solved. The present
model is similar in spirit to that in Krusell and Smith (1998), where there is no participation
decision. As a result, here the consumer’s problem is considerably more nonlinear, as there are
always consumers (i) deeply in the non-participation region, (ii) deeply in the participation
region, and (iii) near indiﬀerence between participating and not participating in the labor
market.
The model is computed using Krusell and Smith’s (1998) limited information approach—
we restrict Ω to a few variables that can easily be kept track of, let the consumers make
decisions based on this limited information and simple forecasting rules that are based on
this information, and check whether their forecast is consistent with what actually happens
in the economy that consists of these consumers. We describe the procedure, and document
that it works very well, in Appendix A.3.
174.2.1 Results 1: The Model With Friction Shocks Only
In this subsection we argue that use of two-state models that completely abstract from
labor supply considerations along the extensive margin can deliver misleading conclusions
regarding the kinds of shocks that account for labor market ﬂuctuations. Consider, for
example, the simple two-state model that Shimer (2005) used in his analysis. By construction,
ﬂuctuations in E and U are mirror images of each other. Since in the data there is relatively
little movement in the participation rate, it follows that if one takes the ﬂow rates between
E and U as measured in the data and exogenously feeds them into the model, one will
approximately reproduce the ﬂuctuations in E and U found in the data. Researchers who
view the world through the lens of such a two-state model will conclude that a suﬃcient
condition for understanding the key features of labor market ﬂuctuations is to understand
movements in the two ﬂow rates between E and U. In this section we examine this conclusion
in the context of our three state model and show that it no longer holds.
Calibration of the Shocks To proceed we assume that both λ and σ follow symmetric
two-state Markov processes with persistence parameters ρλ and ρσ respectively. Speciﬁcally,
if we let ¯ λ and ¯ σ denote the calibrated steady state values of the two frictions, we assume
that λ takes values in the set {λG,λB} where λG = ¯ λ + ελ and λB = ¯ λ − ελ, and similarly
that σ takes values in the set {σG,σB} where σG = ¯ σ − εσ and σB = ¯ σ + εσ. For simplicity,
we assume that the two shocks are perfectly (negatively) correlated, so that the aggregate
realizations are either both good or both bad. We therefore assume that ρλ = ρσ = ρ,
and consistent with much of the real business cycle literature assume that ρ = .983. The
values of ελ and εσ are then set so that in the simulated equilibrium, we match the volatility
of fEU and fUE reported in Table 3. The calibrated values are (λG,λB) = (0.51,0.37),
18(σG,σB) = (0.01254,0.01346).
Cyclical Properties of Stocks By construction, the model accounts perfectly for the
cyclical movements in the two rates fEU and fUE. But how will it perform along other
dimensions? As a ﬁrst step in answering this question Table 4 examines the cyclical properties
of the three stocks: E, U and N as well as output.
Table 4
Behavior of Stocks with Friction Shocks Only
Volatilities: std(x) Correlations: corrcoef(x,Y )
u lfpr E u lfpr E
Data .12 .003 .011 −.87 .46 .84
Frictions .11 .007 .002 −.91 −.80 .48
Note ﬁrst that this model accounts for almost all of the ﬂuctuations in unemployment
that are found in the data, and that they are strongly negatively correlated with output
ﬂuctuations. Based on this, one could conclude that the model with only shocks to frictions
does a good job of accounting for unemployment ﬂuctuations. However, Table 4 also reveals
that the model accounts for less than 20% of the movements in employment. The failure
to account for employment ﬂuctuations is mirrored in some counterfactual predictions for
participation: participation rate ﬂuctuations in the model are more than two times as large
as in the data, and are strongly countercyclical instead of mildly procyclical.
The fact that employment ﬂuctuations are not a mirror image of unemployment ﬂuctua-
tions reﬂects the presence of an operative labor supply margin, i.e., a participation decision,
that provides individuals with the opportunity to make choices that partially oﬀset the direct
eﬀect of changes in frictions. As a ﬁrst step in exploring the underlying economic mechanism,
consider how the participation region changes as the economy moves from the bad aggregate
state to the good aggregate state. Figure 1 illustrates this by plotting the optimal decision
rules for the two diﬀerent realizations of the aggregate friction shocks, evaluated at the mean
19level of the other aggregate states. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁgure partitions the space of individual
state variables into participation and non-participation regions.
Figure 1: Cut-oﬀ wealth and productivity levels for the model with frictions shocks only





















Because the other aggregate state variables (the capital stock and the lagged capital to
labor ratio in our solution method) will also change over the cycle, this ﬁgure does not capture
the changes in decision rules associated with the change in these variables. However, to the
extent that the other aggregate state variables are not that volatile and change slowly over
time, the ﬁgure does capture the relevant ﬁrst order changes in decision rules over the cycle.
The important message from Figure 1 is that when frictions become more severe, thereby
making it more diﬃcult to obtain employment, individuals respond by enlarging the set of
individual states in which they will work.10 Note that this manifests itself in two ways:
individuals who are employed will be less likely to move out of employment in response
to idiosyncratic shocks, and some individuals who are not employed will decide to accept
employment opportunities under conditions that they previously would not. Also note that
both the heterogeneity in wealth and idiosyncratic productivity play active roles: the curve
10In Krusell et al. (2010) we demonstrated that this eﬀect was quantitatively important in terms of steady
state outcomes. Here we see that the eﬀect is quantitatively signiﬁcant in a business cycle context as well.
20describing indiﬀerence is neither vertical nor horizontal.
This eﬀect is intuitive. A key desire for individuals in this economy is to arrange the
timing of work to coincide with periods of high individual productivity. Frictions interfere
with an individual’s ability to achieve the desired timing. When frictions become more severe,
individuals respond by expanding the set of conditions under which they will work if given
the opportunity, i.e., by becoming less choosy. The implication is that participation will be
countercyclical. While the magnitude of this eﬀect will depend on the density of individuals
around the boundary of the two regions, this ﬁgure illustrates the main economic mechanism
at work. It is also important to emphasize that the magnitude of this eﬀect depends critically
on the size of income and substitution eﬀects in labor supply. In particular, a model with
linear utility and hence no income eﬀects will underestimate the desire of individuals to work
more in response to changes that lower income.
Transition Dynamics To gain additional insight into the workings of the model it is
instructive to examine how the transition rates between the various labor market states
respond when the aggregate state changes from the bad state to the good state. Speciﬁcally,
we simulate the economy for a large number of periods and individuals and pick a speciﬁc
time interval where the economy moves from a bad state to a good state.11 We then calculate
the log deviation of individual transition rates. The results are shown in Figure 2.
The patterns found in Figure 2 are all intuitive. We begin with the ﬂows between E and
U, which are the simplest. To move from E to U across adjacent periods three things must
happen: a worker must suﬀer a separation, not receive a new employment opportunity, and
not suﬀer an idiosyncratic shock that changes their desire to work. The probability of the
11We simulate the economy for 5,000 periods and discard the initial 1,000 periods. The interval we selected
corresponds to a period where the economy moves from a B state in period 20 to a G state that lasts for 200
periods.
21Figure 2: Response of ﬂows to a positive shock for the model with frictions shocks only














































ﬁrst two events is σ(1 − λ), which is clearly higher in the good state. We discuss the third
event in more detail below, and argue that it moves in the opposite direction. However,
its eﬀect is second order compared to the change in λ. Similarly, to move from U to E
across adjacent periods requires that two things happen: the individual must receive a work
opportunity, and not suﬀer an idiosyncratic shock that changes their desire to work. Once
again, the dominant factor is the increase in λ, and hence this ﬂow also increases.
The movements between N and the other states are slightly more subtle. To gain in-
tuition into these movements we consider a simple heuristic example. In the example, the
participation decision depends only on the idiosyncratic shock and takes the form of a thresh-
old rule. To the extent that aggregate states and individual assets are slowly evolving in the
true model, dynamics in idiosyncratic shocks dominate the movement of individuals between
participation and non-participation, and this heuristic example oﬀers some insight into the
ﬂows in Figure 2.
To examine the ﬂows in the heuristic example, Consider Figure 3, which plots a single-
peaked density that we take to represent the invariant distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks.
The two lines indicated on the ﬁgure represent the optimal decision rules in the good and
22bad states.
Figure 3: to Optimal decision rules in the heuristic example
Participate
B z G z B z G z
Consistent with Figure 1, the threshold for participation becomes higher when frictions
are less severe. Mapping out the response of the various transition rates in this example
following a switch in the aggregate state from bad to good can shed light on the patterns in
Figure 2. Note that in Figure 2 there is a distinction between the long run eﬀect and the eﬀect
in the initial period. This distinction is also present in the example. In the period in which
the state changes from bad to good, all of the workers with idiosyncratic shocks between the
two thresholds will move from in the labor force to out of the labor force. However, after
the initial period, all movements into and out of the labor force are dictated solely by the
movement of individuals across the threshold productivity.
We begin by focusing on the longer run changes. Loosely speaking, the movement of
individuals across the boundary—in both directions—will be dictated by the mass of workers
around the boundary. For the conﬁguration shown in Figure 3, the density is increasing as
we move from the lower threshold to the higher threshold, suggesting that these ﬂows will
increase.12 If we had placed the thresholds on the other side of the peak in the density
12In the model there is also a “liquidity eﬀect” at work—in recessions there are more nonemployed workers
23function, the implication would be reversed, but since in the true model the participation
rate always exceeds ﬁfty percent, the conﬁguration shown in Figure 3 is the empirically
relevant one.
If more individuals are crossing the boundarybetween participation and non-participation,
both E to N and U to N ﬂows will increase since this eﬀect is at work independently of
whether the individual is in E or U. This long run eﬀect is evident in Figure 2.13 The ﬂow
from out of the labor force into the labor force also increases, but now the change in λ also
inﬂuences the separate ﬂows into the E and U destinations. Transitions from N to E oc-
cur when an individual both crosses the threshold and receives an employment opportunity.
Since the probability of each of these increases as we move from the bad shock to the good
shock, the N to E ﬂow necessarily increases. For the N to U ﬂow, these two eﬀects move in
opposite directions. It turns out that the eﬀect due to the change in λ is substantially larger
than the change in the hazard of crossing the threshold, and as a result, the long run change
in this ﬂow is negative. Again, these eﬀects are found in Figure 2.
Now we turn to analyzing the eﬀects in the initial period in which the aggregate shock
changes. In the initial period, the above eﬀects will be augmented with a large one time
ﬂow out of the labor force that is associated with those individuals who lie in between the
two thresholds. This induces an increase in both E to N and U to N, which shows up in
Figure 2 as a greater increase in both of these ﬂows in the initial period relative to later
periods. Because entry into the labor force in the initial period requires crossing a much
that are close to the borrowing constraint, thus increasing their desire to work. As discussed below, the
responses in Figure 2 suggest that this eﬀect is relatively small.
13In fact, there is an additional, reinforcing eﬀect. Although the change in the average productivity of
the labor force is determined solely by the threshold productivity, a change in λ inﬂuences the distribution of
productivity within the employed and unemployed groups. Intuitively, as λ increases, unemployment durations
decrease and the unemployment pool is more heavily represented by the newly unemployed, who tend to be
of lower productivity. The net eﬀect is that the unemployment pool has a greater share of its workers close
to the threshold, further increasing the U to N transition rate.
24higher threshold than in the previous period, there is a negative eﬀect on the ﬂows from out
of the labor force in the initial period. Hence, the initial drop in the N to U ﬂow is even
more negative than the long run response. For the N to E ﬂow, Figure 2 is consistent with
the initial eﬀect dominating the long run eﬀect by a small amount, so that the net eﬀect
is a small decrease in the initial period, followed by a large increase thereafter. Note that
for the most part the magnitudes of the ﬂows change very little beyond the second period,
suggesting that our heuristic device of ignoring the eﬀects of changes in assets over time is
not of ﬁrst order importance.
Cyclical Properties of Flows Having analyzed the transition dynamics in detail, it is
instructive to examine the business cycle statistics for the ﬂows. They are reported in Table
5.
Table 5
Cyclical Properties of Transition Rates: Model with Friction Shocks Only
Volatilities: std(x) Correlations: corr(x,Y )
fEU fEN fUE fUN fNE fNU fEU fEN fUE fUN fNE fNU
Data .085 .032 .077 .060 .043 .064 −.82 .33 .78 .78 .64 −.70
Model .085 .044 .077 .043 .087 .066 −.72 .43 .76 .43 .84 −.53
By construction, the model matches the volatility of the transition rates fEU and fUE.
However, the model also seems to do a reasonable job of capturing the behavior of many of
the other ﬂows as well, both in terms of magnitude and correlation with output. Interestingly,
although the participation rate in the model had the wrong correlation with output relative to
the data, all of the underlying ﬂows in the model have the same correlation with output as is
found in the data. The reason that the participation rate ends up with the wrong correlation
is apparently due to more subtle diﬀerences between the model and the data involving the
relative magnitudes and correlations of the various ﬂows. For example, the ﬂow from E to
N is both more volatile and displays a slightly higher correlation with output in the model
25than in the data.
Summary In summary, although the model with shocks only to frictions can generate
substantial movements in unemployment, and captures many features of the transition rates,
it generates changes in employment that are far too small, and changes in participation that
are too large and of the wrong correlation with output. While the appeal of this type of
speciﬁcation is derived from the fact that researchers have examined it in settings with the
participation rate exogenously ﬁxed, we ﬁnd that this assumption of constant participation
is in fact inconsistent with the other features of the model when embedded into a setting
that allows for an empirically reasonable labor supply response along the extensive margin.
4.2.2 Results II: The Model With TFP Shocks Only
In this subsection we consider the case in which the only shock is a shock to aggregate TFP.
It is well known in the business cycle literature that this type of shock is capable of generating
ﬂuctuations in employment and the components of aggregate output that capture the key
patterns found in the data. Our main objective here is to assess the ability of this case to
match the additional facts that we documented in Section 2. While there is no presumption
that this type of shock will work, we carry out this exercise because it is informative to
understand the successes and failures of this model vis-a-vis the data.
Calibration of Shocks To proceed we consider a symmetric two-state Markov process on
Z with persistence parameter ρZ and Z taking values in the set {ZG,ZB}, where ZG = 1+εZ
and ZB = 1 − εZ. To illustrate the eﬀects of this type of shock we choose ρZ = 0.983 to
be consistent with much of the real business cycle literature. We choose εZ to match the
standard deviation of employment in the data. The resulting value is εZ = 0.0290.
26Cyclical Properties of Stocks Panel B in Table 6 displays the cyclical properties for
model generated data. For completeness, we include values from the data in Panel A.
Table 6
Cyclical Properties of Labor Market Variables
A. Data
E u lfpr fEU fEN fUE fUN fNE fNU
std(x) .011 .12 .003 .085 .032 .077 .060 .043 .064
corrcoef(x,Y ) .84 −.87 .46 −.82 .33 .78 .78 .64 −.70
corrcoef(x,x−1) .92 .92 .72 .73 .20 .84 .73 .41 .75
B. Model
E u lfpr fEU fEN fUE fUN fNE fNU
std(x) .011 .03 .010 .028 .053 .012 .051 .034 .034
corrcoef(x,Y ) .95 −.55 .93 .06 −.28 .01 .04 −.17 −.19
corrcoef(x,x−1) .76 .39 .72 −.03 .07 −.11 −.02 −.13 −.13
By construction, the model accounts for all of the ﬂuctuations in employment in the data.
However, it fares poorly on the behavior of the two other stocks. First, although the model
does capture the fact that the participation rate is procyclical and the unemployment rate is
countercyclical, it misses on the relative volatility of the two by an order of magnitude. In
fact, the standard deviation of the employment-to-population ratio is only slightly larger than
that of the labor force participation rate, implying that virtually all of the ﬂuctuations in
employment are due to ﬂuctuations in participation. One critique of standard real business
cycle models with an operative extensive margin (e.g., Hansen (1985)) was that although
they could generate substantial ﬂuctuations in employment, they were silent on the issue of
unemployment. By including frictions, our model does allow one to connect with data on
unemployment, and perhaps not surprisingly, shows that when the only shocks to the model
are to aggregate TFP, virtually none of the employment ﬂuctuations show up as oﬀsetting
ﬂuctuations in unemployment.
To gain more insight into the underlying economics, it is again instructive to examine how
decision rules and ﬂows are aﬀected by the aggregate productivity shock. Figure 4 plots the
27behavior of the decision rule for participation that is equivalent to Figure 1 in the previous
subsection.
Figure 4: Cut-oﬀ wealth and productivity levels for the model with TFP shocks only





















This ﬁgure illustrates the standard intertemporal substitution eﬀects present in standard
real business cycle models: when productivity is high individuals choose to work more, which
corresponds to expanding the set of individual states in which they desire to work. This is
the eﬀect that leads to procyclical employment and participation. To the extent that the
employment responses reﬂect standard intertemporal substitution, it may seem a curiosity
that unemployment in this exercise does ﬂuctuate countercyclically. We will be able to oﬀer
an explanation for this after we study transition dynamics in more detail.
Transition Dynamics Figure 5 shows how transition rates respond when the economy
moves from a low aggregate productivity shock to a high one, and is computed in an analogous
fashion to Figure 2.
Having analyzed the transition dynamics in the previous exercise in some detail, it is
relatively easy to explain the patterns in Figure 5 with similar arguments. We start with
the ﬂows between E and U. The ﬁgure shows that there is eﬀectively no change in the E
28Figure 5: Response of ﬂows to a positive shock for the model with TFP shocks only



















































to U and U to E transition rates. Consistent with our earlier analysis, these transitions are
dominated by the frictional parameters λ and σ, and since they are constant there is virtually
no change in the transition rates.
Our previous heuristic example is again useful to understand the ﬂows between N and
the other states. However, whereas a decrease in frictions led to a rightward movement of the
threshold for participation, an increase in aggregate productivity leads to a leftward shift of
the threshold, thereby reversing the implications. That is, there will now be fewer individuals
who cross the threshold between participation and non-participation.
Again it is important to distinguish between changes in the period of the initial change in
productivity versus the longer run change. By analogy with our earlier arguments, we now
expect both the E to N and U to N ﬂows to decrease in the long run. This is consistent
with Figure 5, though note that the changes are quite small.14 Because the value of λ is
unchanged, we expect to see this same pattern for both the N to U and N to E ﬂows, and
this is indeed evident in Figure 5.
14In particular, note that the change in the U to N transition rate is much smaller in this case than in the
case with friction shocks. As noted there, the threshold eﬀect was augmented by an additional eﬀect due to
how changes in λ aﬀect the productivity distribution within the unemployment pool.
29Next consider the changes in transition rates during the initial period in which the aggre-
gate productivity shock changes. Because the threshold moves to the left there will be a one
time increase in participation associated with the entry of all those individuals with idiosyn-
cratic shocks between the two threshold values. As a result, we expect to see an increase in
both N to U and N to E transition rates on impact, and a decrease in both E to N and U
to N transition rates. These patterns are also found in Figure 5.
Note that there is a slight bump in the U to E transition rate in the initial period. The
movement in the threshold causes fewer unemployed people to leave the labor force in the
initial period, increasing the overall rate at which these individuals transit into employment.
Whereas this eﬀect is also present beyond the initial period, the size of this eﬀect is much
larger in the initial period because it reﬂects the mass of workers in between the two thresholds
and not just the movement of individuals across the threshold.
Having studied the behavior of the ﬂows we are now in a position to address the coun-
tercyclical movement of the unemployment rate that was documented in Table 6. Given
that frictions are constant, it may seem surprising that unemployment is countercyclical.
The reason lies in the fact that there are now fewer ﬂows into and out of the labor force,
which therefore decreases the ﬂow into the unemployment pool. Speciﬁcally, if employed
individuals leave the labor force and later re-enter, they will typically experience a spell of
unemployment. By decreasing the ﬂow of individuals out of the labor force, this return ﬂow
is also reduced, thereby reducing one source of unemployment.
It is of interest to compare our ﬁndings from this exercise with the results in Veracierto
(2008). Although Veracierto’s model has predictions for the stocks of workers in the three
labor market states, the gross ﬂows are not uniquely determined due to the fact that in equi-
librium many workers are necessarily indiﬀerent between two transitions. However, we can
30compare predictions about the number of workers in each of the three states. While there are
some diﬀerences in details regarding model speciﬁcation, he also considers aggregate TFP
shocks, and similar to us, he ﬁnds that although the model can generate substantial ﬂuctu-
ations in employment, it fares very poorly in accounting for the behavior of unemployment
and participation. In particular, he ﬁnds that unemployment becomes procyclical. Veracierto
ascribes the procyclical unemployment rate to the fact that when a high TFP shock occurs,
individuals move from not-participating to participating, thereby increasing unemployment
because it takes time to ﬁnd a job. Figure 6 shows the dynamics in our model following an
increase in Z from ZB to ZG assuming that Z remains at this level. The ﬁgure shows that
our model has the same initial response to an increase in TFP as in Veracierto’s model; that
is, there is an immediate jump in the size of the labor force and an increase in unemployment.
However, over time these individuals will become employed, and in our model the unemploy-
ment rate approaches a lower level than attained prior to the shock. This asymptotic response
turns out to dominate the immediate eﬀect in terms of its eﬀect on the correlation between
the unemployment rate and output. Hence, while our model does not match the volatility of
the unemployment rate, it does produce a countercyclical unemployment rate. Despite this
diﬀerence with the results in Veracierto, our model displays quantitative responses that are
quite similar to his.
One diﬀerence between Veracierto’s model and ours is that he assumes search is costly.
Here we argue that this diﬀerence is not likely to be important. Consider an extension of our
model in which a worker who is nonemployed has to exert some (indivisible) search eﬀort in
order to receive a job oﬀer. If this search eﬀort is costly, only some of the workers that we
classify as being in U would choose to exert job search eﬀort.15 In the limit as the search
15Workers whom we identify as being in N do not exert any eﬀort since they prefer to stay nonemployed
even without any search cost.
31Figure 6: Response of labor market stocks to a positive shock for the model with TFP shocks
only
































cost approaches zero, all workers that we categorize as being in U would choose to exert job
search eﬀort. To the extent that search costs are relatively low, we therefore do not believe
that adding search costs would overturn our ﬁndings.
More generally, another piece of intuition in the literature is that if search eﬀort and
the ease of ﬁnding a job are complements, and if unemployment is the activity of search,
then unemployment should be procyclical. Shimer (2004) questions the assumption that
search eﬀort and the ease of ﬁnding a job are complements. Moreover, assuming a small
but strictly positive search cost, our analysis in this and the previous subsection suggests
that search eﬀort among the non-employed can either increase or decrease over the cycle,
depending upon the nature of the shock causing the cycle. We believe that one reason for
the presumption that search eﬀort is complementary with the ease of ﬁnding a job is that
much of the search literature assumes linear utility and hence no income eﬀfects. The fact
that search intensity can be countercylical in our model is related to income eﬀects: holding
search intensity ﬁxed, if it is harder to ﬁnd a job then expected income decreases, leading to
32greater search eﬀort to maintain consumption.16
Whether nonemployed workers search harder during recessions is ultimately an empirical
issue. Recent work suggests that if anything, search intensity may be countercyclical. For
example, Shimer (2004) examines several indicators of aggregate search intensity over time.
One of his indicators, the number of search methods used by attached workers, increased
during 2001 (his Figure 4). A similar pattern holds even when the sample is limited to active
job searchers (see his Figure 7). For earlier periods this measure of search intensity does not
exhibit a strong cyclical pattern, but it does always increase during recessionary periods (see
his Figure 8).
In summary, we think our main ﬁndings are robust to the incorporation of small search
costs. While we think it is of interest to extend our analysis to allow for endogenous search
intensity, we also think additional empirical work on search intensity is required in order to
guide the development of these theories.
Cyclical Properties of Flows Having looked at how the transition rates respond, we now
return to the cyclical behavior of the transition rates in Table 6. If one were to only look
at the standard deviations one might conclude that the model is doing a reasonable job in
capturing some of the ﬂuctuations. But when one looks at the correlations with output and
the autocorrelations it is apparent that the model is capturing virtually none of the dynamics
that is present in the ﬂows in the data. The reason for the failure along this dimension is that
productivity shocks lead to almost no persistent change in transition rates. That is, almost
all of the ﬂuctuations in transition rates are due to the eﬀects that take place in the period
16Shimer (2004) questions the assumption that search eﬀort and the ease of ﬁnding a job are complements
and he argues that it is plausible to have a modiﬁed view of job search eﬀort where some workers respond to
deterioriating labor market conditions by increasing their search intensity. He then constructs a model where
search intensity can be countercyclical.
33of the impact. This is in contrast to the case with friction shocks only, where we found much
larger and persistent changes in the EU, UE, NU, and NE ﬂows.
4.3 Results III: Shocks to TFP and Frictions—The Benchmark
A very simple characterization of the ﬁndings from our ﬁrst two exercises is that a model with
shocks to frictions can do a reasonable job of accounting for the behavior of unemployment
and many of the transition rates, whereas a model with shocks to TFP can do a reasonable of
accounting for the behavior of employment. Neither model seems capable of accounting for
the behavior of participation, since in both cases participation seems to ﬂuctuate too much.
However, it is interesting to note that although in both cases the participation rate ﬂuctuates
too much, in the case of TFP shocks it is procyclical whereas in the case of friction shocks it
is countercyclical. Noting these results, it seems possible that a model that features shocks
to both frictions and TFP could do a reasonable job of accounting for a large set of the labor
market facts. In this section we show this to be the case.
Calibration of Shocks As before, we assume that Z, λ, and σ all follow symmetric two-
state Markov processes, and we keep the same notation in terms of denoting good and bad
states. Once again, for ease of exposition, we focus on the case in which the shocks are
all perfectly correlated, so that only two realizations can occur: either all values are good
or all values are bad. Our main goal is to show that this type of speciﬁcation can capture
many of the facts from Section 2. We set ρZ = 0.983 similar to above. εZ is calibrated to
0.0287 to match the standard deviation of employment in the data. We choose the volatility
of the two transition rates between employment and unemployment so that their standard
deviations are the same as in the data. The calibrated values for the shock processes are
(λG,λB) = (0.509,0.371) and (σG,σB) = (0.01249,0.01351).
34Cyclical Properties of Stocks Table 7 shows the results for the cyclical behavior of
employment, the unemployment rate and the participation rate.
Table 7
Behavior of Stocks with TFP and Friction Shocks
Volatilities: std(x) Correlations: corr(x,Y )
u lfpr E u lfpr E
Data .12 .003 .011 −.87 .46 .84
Model .13 .004 .011 −.98 .56 .97
While the volatility of employment in the model is the same as that in the data by
construction, the model also does a good job of accounting for the size of ﬂuctuations in
both unemployment and participation. Additionally, it also correctly accounts for the fact
that employment is strongly procyclical, the unemployment rate is strongly countercyclical,
and the labor force participation rate is weakly procyclical. We noted previously that in
each of the ﬁrst two exercises, the participation rate ﬂuctuated too much. However, because
the two shocks move participation in opposite directions, when both shocks are present the
overall eﬀect on participation is much smaller than the individual eﬀects. The cyclicality of
the participation rate is dependent on the relative magnitudes of the shocks. Figure 7 once
again shows the behavior of the decision rule for participation in the good and bad states.
Figure 7: Cut-oﬀ wealth and productivity levels for the benchmark model





















35This ﬁgure indicates that for the parameterization in this exercise, individuals increase
their desire to participate in good times, though the increase is smaller than what was
observed for the case of aggregate productivity shocks only, as shown in Figure 4. While
the sign of the net eﬀect on participation is obviously dependent on parameter values, we do
want to emphasize that a robust feature of this speciﬁcation is that the participation rate
will exhibit much less cyclicality than either employment or the unemployment rate.
In addition to making predictions about the cyclicality of the number of individuals un-
employed, our model also has interesting implications for the mix of individuals that are
unemployed and how it varies over the cycle. An issue that has recently received attention
is how the average quality of unemployed workers changes over the business cycle. Mueller
(2010), for example, ﬁnds that the average quality of the unemployed is countercyclical and
suggests that this is a useful diagnostic for evaluating theories of unemployment. The average
value for idiosyncratic productivity among unemployed workers in our model is countercycli-
cal, consistent with the evidence in Mueller.
Transition Dynamics Figure 8 again shows the responses of the transition rates as the
economy moves from bad times to good times, analogously to what we previously showed in
Figures 2 and 5.
We will not discuss these responses in detail, but note that they are eﬀectively a convex
combination of the results previously shown for the two shocks individually and hence do not
present any novel eﬀects relative to the earlier analysis.
Cyclical Properties of Flows Table 8 shows the results for the transition probabilities.
This table shows that the model does a good job of accounting for the key patterns. The
model captures the countercyclicality of unemployment inﬂows (EU and NU ﬂow rates),
36Figure 8: Response of ﬂows to a positive shock for the benchmark model












































procylicality of unemployment outﬂows (UE and NU ﬂow rates) and mild procyclicality of
the EN ﬂow rate. The model delivers a volatility and correlation (with output) for fNE that
are somewhat too high.
Table 8
Flows in the Model with TFP Shocks and Friction Shocks
A. Data
fEU fEN fUE fUN fNE fNU
std(x) .085 .032 .077 .060 .043 .064
corrcoef(x,Y ) −.82 .33 .78 .78 .64 −.70
corrcoef(x,x−1) .73 .20 .84 .73 .41 .75
B. Model
fEU fEN fUE fUN fNE fNU
std(x) .085 .031 .077 .051 .080 .066
corr(x,Y ) −.90 .35 .92 .56 .89 −.92
corr(x,x−1) .68 .09 .72 .30 .70 .68
Decompositions Given that the above speciﬁcation does a reasonable job of accounting
for the cyclical ﬂuctuations of the labor market variables, it is of interest to decompose the
ﬂuctuations in various series into the parts attributable to each of the three shocks: Z, λ,
and σ. To do this we simply recompute the model assuming that two of the three shocks are
shut down. Table 9 does this for the three aggregates. It also reports the correlations of the
37variables with output for each speciﬁcation.
Table 9
Contribution of the Shocks: Stocks
Volatilities: std(x) Correlations: corr(x,Y )
Y u lfpr E u lfpr E
Data .016 .12 .003 .011 −.87 .46 .84
All .020 .13 .004 .011 −.98 .56 .95
Z .018 .03 .010 .011 −.55 .93 .95
λ .001 .10 .007 .002 −.89 −.77 .42
σ .000 .01 .001 .001 −.33 −.16 .07
Several results are notable. First, consistently with our earlier results, the shocks to λ
are the quantitatively most important ones for the ﬂuctuations in the unemployment rate
whereas the ﬂuctuations in Z are the most important ones for the ﬂuctuations in employment.
Note that allowing for ﬂuctuations in frictions does not diminish the role that TFP shocks
play in accounting for ﬂuctuations in employment. From the perspective of employment
ﬂuctuations the model looks very much like the model that has only TFP shocks. The key
eﬀect of frictions vis-a-vis employment ﬂuctuations is that they change the participation
dynamics so that unemployment ﬂuctuations are now much closer to being the mirror image
of employment ﬂuctuations.
Fluctuations in σ are relatively unimportant for all three stocks. It may seem somewhat
surprising that shocks to σ are so unimportant given that the transition rates between E and
U ﬂuctuate by roughly the same amount. To obtain some insight into this Table 10 carries
out the same exercise for the two transition rates between E and U.
38Table 10
Contribution of the Shocks: Flows
std(x) corrcoef(x,Y )
fEU fUE fEU fUE
Data .085 .077 −.82 .78
All .085 .077 −.90 .92
z .027 .012 .04 −.01
λ .069 .076 −.67 .74
σ .033 .011 −.49 −.05
An interesting result here is that even when there are only shocks to λ so that σ is
constant, the model accounts for roughly 80% of the volatility in fEU. This is because
we allow individuals to receive an employment opportunity in the same period that they
experience an employment separation shock. It follows that the likelihood of an E to U ﬂow
is aﬀected by the value of λ. To see why this is, note that when λ is low it is more likely
that a worker who experiences an employment separation will remain in the unemployment
state. This phenomenon in the model captures an important feature that is present in the
actual data. That is, in the household survey, an individual who transits from employment
to unemployment after an interview date, but who receives a job oﬀer and starts to work
prior to the next interview date will be recorded as an E to E ﬂow. The higher is the job
oﬀer arrival rate, the greater is the chance that this worker will be recorded as an E to E
transition.17
Note that in the model with only shocks to σ there is also an eﬀect on the transition
rate from U to E. This may at ﬁrst seem somewhat surprising. However, this eﬀect is due
to a one-time eﬀect associated with changes in the value of σ. The nature of the eﬀect is
that during good times (i.e., when σ decreases), some people move from participation to
non-participation due to the fact that as it becomes easier to work when one desires, one
17As an alternative exercise we could ask what types of ﬂuctuations result if we assumed that there were
only shocks to σ but that the size of these shocks were suﬃcient to match the volatility in fEU.
39becomes more particular about timing periods of work with high values of the idiosyncratic
shocks. As a result, during the period in which σ changes from high to low, some of the
previously unemployed move to non-participation and hence even though they receive em-
ployment opportunities they choose not to work. This causes a one-time reduction in fUE.
The fact that it is a one-time reduction is evident in the very low correlation between fUE
and output in the case of shocks only to σ.
5 Conclusion
We have developed a general equilibrium model of gross worker ﬂows and used it to study
the role of various shocks in accounting for business cycle ﬂuctuations in the labor market.
A key message from our analysis is that our model oﬀers important insights into the forces
that drive business cycle ﬂuctuations in the labor market. In contrast to the implications
of standard two-state models that stress matching frictions, we ﬁnd that ﬂuctuations in
employment loss and employment oﬀer rates are unable to account for the key patterns in
labor market variables over the business cycle unless they are combined with a cyclical shock
to the return to market activity. We ﬁnd that a model that features both these drivers of
ﬂuctuations is able to account for the main features not only of labor market aggregates but
also of gross worker ﬂows.
Our model oﬀers a rich description of individual labor supply in a setting with heterogene-
ity, search frictions and an empirically reasonable market structure. It is the ﬁrst paper to
consider the eﬀects of aggregate shocks on individual labor market transitions in this setting.
However, it is also simplistic in some dimensions relevant for the microeconomic data. One of
these dimensions regards our model of the household as an inﬁnitely-lived unit. Clearly, an
extension that distinguishes diﬀerent members of the households would be relevant, as would
40an age dimension. Also, we have left out details of job experiences, including any speciﬁcs of
what inﬂuences individual productivity (such as learning on the job and on-the-job search).
Similarly, we abstract from an explicit consideration of search costs. We do believe that our
framework is a very useful starting point for extensions in all these directions. Related, we
also believe that it is useful for assessing a variety of further issues, such as the heterogeneous
eﬀects of business cycles on various subgroups of the population. While we have focused on
aggregate shocks to frictions and the return to market activity, we can also study other
aggregate shocks, including various candidates for demand shocks.
Finally, as pointed out above, in contrast with much of the literature—in particular the
recent studies of Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005)—we leave open what the deeper explanations
for the ﬂuctuations in labor market frictions might be, as we leave open what drives the
returns to market activity and any connections between these shocks. The good performance
of the model of course makes it all the more important to further isolate and study these
drivers. One view in the literature is that a search/matching model with rigid wage formation
and frictions that are entirely driven by productivity ﬂuctuations can explain the data well.
From the present perspective, such a model will likely be hard to square with labor market
ﬂows, since we have found the movements in the return to market activity necessary for
understanding them.
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44Appendix
A.1 Data
The Current Population Survey (CPS) reports the labor market status of the respondents
each month that allows the BLS to compute important labor market statistics like the unem-
ployment rate. In particular, in any given month a civilian can be in one of three labor force
states: employed (E), unemployed (U), and not in the labor force (N). The BLS deﬁnitions
for the three labor market states are as follows:
• An individual is counted as employed if he or she did any work at all for pay or proﬁt
during the survey month. This includes part-time or temporary work as well as full-time
year-round employment.
• An individual is considered unemployed if he or she does not have a job, has actively
looked for employment in the past 4 weeks and is currently available to work.
• An individual is classiﬁed as not in the labor force if he or she is included in the labor
force population universe (older than 16 years old, non-military, noninstitutionalized)
but are neither employed nor unemployed.
Households are interviewed for four consecutive months, rotate out for eight months and
then rotate in for another four months. The panel feature of the CPS makes it possible to
calculate transitions by individual workers between these three labor market states. However,
not all the respondents stay in the sample for consecutive months; the rotating feature of the
panel implies that only 75 percent are reinterviewed according to the CPS sampling design.
Moreover, many other respondents cannot be found in the consecutive month due to various
reasons and are reported as missing. The failure to match individuals in consecutive months
is known as margin error and it causes biased estimates of the ﬂow rates as discussed by
45Abowd and Zellner (1985), Fujita and Ramey (2009), and Poterba and Summers (1986). The
simplest correction for margin error is to simply drop the missing observations and reweight
the transitions that are measured, a procedure that is known as the missing-at-random
(MAR) method. However, this procedure could lead to biases if missing observations are not
missing at random. To deal with this problem, Abowd and Zellner (1985) and Poterba and
Summers (1986) proposed alternative corrections for margin error which use information on
labor market stocks. Their correction reweights the unadjusted ﬂows in order to minimizes
the distance between the reported labor market stocks and the stocks that are imputed
from the labor market transitions. We follow the algorithm proposed by Elsby, Hobijn, and
S ¸ahin (2011), which is similar in spirit to Poterba and Summers’ method, but diﬀers in
implementation. We use the basic monthly CPS ﬁles from January 1976 to December 2009
and data from January 1968 to December 1975 based on tabulations by Joe Ritter using data
that was made available by Hoyt Bleakley. All transition probabilities are calculated for the
population older than 16 years old and are seasonally adjusted.
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46A.2 Calibration of the Steady State
There is strong evidence in the literature (see, e.g., Poterba and Summers (1986)) that
classiﬁcation errors lead to spurious ﬂows, especially between unemployment and not in the
labor force. To capture this we will also add a measurement equation to our model. To
facilitate exposition we will calibrate the model assuming no classiﬁcation error and then
show how the model’s implications are aﬀected when we add this type of error.
The steady state model has nine parameters that need to be assigned: preference param-
eters β and α, production parameters θ and δ, idiosyncratic shock parameters ρz and σεz,
frictional parameters σ and λ, and the tax rate τ. Because data on labor market transitions
are available monthly, we set the length of a period to be one month. We set τ = .30.18 Be-
cause our model is a variation of the standard growth model, we can assign some parameter
values following standard procedures used to calibrate versions of the growth model. Because
of incomplete markets and idiosyncratic uncertainty, we cannot derive analytic expressions
for the steady state, and so cannot isolate the connection between certain parameters and
target values. Nonetheless, it is still useful and intuitive to associate particular targets and
parameter values. Speciﬁcally, given values for λ, σ, ρz, and σεz, we choose θ = .3 to target
a capital share of .3, δ to achieve an investment to output ratio equal to .2, and the discount
factor β to target an annual real rate of return on capital equal to 4%. The other preference
parameter α, which captures the disutility of working, is set so that the steady state value
of the employment to population ratio is equal to .61. This is the value of the employment
to population ratio for the population aged 16 and older for the period 1968 − 2009.19
18Following the work of Mendoza et al. (1994) there are several papers which produce estimates of the
average eﬀective tax rate on labor income across countries. Minor variations in methods across these studies
produce small diﬀerences in the estimates, but .30 is representative of these estimates.
19We calibrate to values for the period 1968-2009 because this is the period for which we have consistent
measures of labor market ﬂows.
47It remains to choose values for λ, σ, ρz and σεz. Recall that our idiosyncratic shock process
should be viewed as a composite of all idiosyncratic shocks that aﬀect the static return
to working versus not working. Shocks to wages are of course only one such component.
However, since these are the shocks that we have the best measures of, our benchmark
speciﬁcation calibrates the shock process based on estimates of idiosyncratic wage shocks.
Speciﬁcally, we choose values for ρz and σε based on Floden and Linde (2001), who estimated
ρz = .92 and σε = .21 expressed on an annual basis.20 There is an intimate connection
between λ and the unemployment rate in the model. If λ = 1 then unemployment will be
zero, since everyone always has the opportunity to work. We therefore choose λ so that the
steady state unemployment rate matches the average value for the unemployment rate in the
US data for the period 1968 − 2009, which is .061. We choose σ to target the average ﬂow
rate out of employment over our sample period, which is 3.6%. We target this rate based on
our belief that the employment state is the one subject to the least amount of measurement
error.
The labor market ﬂows in our calibrated model and the data are displayed in Table A1.
Table A.1
Flows in the Data and the Model
US 1968-2009 Model
FROM TO FROM TO
E U N E U N
E 0.954 0.016 0.030 E 0.954 0.007 0.039
U 0.270 0.508 0.222 U 0.396 0.505 0.099
N 0.048 0.027 0.925 N 0.035 0.044 0.921
Overall the model does a reasonable job of capturing the salient features of the data.
20Krusell et al. (2011) showed that the ability of the model to account for the ﬂows between states remains
relatively unchanged over a wide range of values of ρ and σε. What mattered most was that ρ was reasonably
persistent (at least .5), but not too close to being a unit root (say less than .97), and that σε was not too
small. An issue for our quantitative exercises is the extent to which diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the shock process
inﬂuence our results, despite having little impact on worker ﬂows. We carry out sensitivity analysis to assess
this.
48Speciﬁcally, it does a good job of capturing the degree of persistence in each of the three
states. One major discrepancy is that the model does not generate enough ﬂows from U to
N. Given our strategy of targeting the stock of workers in U, this necessarily implies that
the other ﬂow out of U (i.e., the ﬂow from U to E) must also be oﬀ. Classiﬁcation error is
discussed in Appendix A.3.
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A.3 Classiﬁcation Error
As discussed in Section 4.1, there is strong evidence that classiﬁcation errors lead to
spurious ﬂows. In this section, we allow classiﬁcation errors to induce spurious transitions
between U and N and examine how our results are aﬀected. In particular, following the
estimates of Poterba and Summers (1986), we assume that a consumer with true state U
state misreports it as N with probability 0.1146 and that a consumer with true state N state
misreports it as U state with probability 0.0064.21 We recalibrate the model, setting α, λ,
and σ in order to match the observed employment population ratio of .61, the average value
of unemployment rate of .061, and the average ﬂow rate out of employment of 3.6%. The
new parameter values are α = 0.606, λ = 0.423, σ = 0.0135.
21Although Poterba and Summers (1981) also describe the classiﬁcation errors for other combinations of
the states, here we focus only on U and N.
49Table A.2
Flows in the Data and the Model with Classiﬁcation Error
US 1968-2009 Model
FROM TO FROM TO
E U N E U N
E 0.954 0.016 0.030 E 0.954 0.007 0.039
U 0.270 0.508 0.222 U 0.363 0.439 0.199
N 0.048 0.027 0.925 N 0.038 0.052 0.910
Steady state ﬂows are presented in Table A.2. Comparing with Table A.1, the UE
transition rate goes down slightly, resulting in a slightly better match with data. The UN
transition rate increases substantially and is almost as high as in the data. The match of the
UU transition rate somewhat worsens.
With this new set of parameter values, we repeat the exercise for our benchmark model,
recalibrating the parameters of the driving forces to match the same targets as in the main
text (the standard deviation of employment, the standard deviation of the EU ﬂow rate,
the standard deviation of the UE ﬂow rate). The new parameter values are: εZ = 0.02895,
(λG,λB) = (0.4937,0.3523), and (σG,σB) = (0.01289,0.01411). Table A.3 presents the
results.
Table A.3
Behavior of Stocks with TFP and Friction Shocks
Volatilities: std(x) Correlations: corr(x,Y )
u lfpr E u lfpr E
Data .12 .003 .011 −.87 .46 .84
Model (Benchmark) .13 .004 .011 −.98 .56 .97
Model (CE) .13 .004 .011 −.98 .38 .97
The row labelled Model (Benchmark) simply repeats Table 7 from the paper. The row
labelled Model (CE) is the model that incorporates classiﬁcation error. The results from the
new exercise are almost identical to the benchmark result, except that the cyclicality of the
labor force participation rate is slightly weaker.
Table A.4 describes the cyclical properties of the ﬂows.
50Table A.4
Flows in the Benchmark and CE Models
A. Data
fEU fEN fUE fUN fNE fNU
std(x) .085 .032 .077 .060 .043 .064
corrcoef(x,Y ) −.82 .33 .78 .78 .64 −.70
corrcoef(x,x−1) .73 .20 .84 .73 .41 .75
B. Model (Benchmark)
fEU fEN fUE fUN fNE fNU
std(x) .085 .031 .077 .051 .080 .066
corr(x,Y ) −.90 .36 .92 .56 .89 −.92
corr(x,x−1) .68 .09 .72 .30 .70 .68
B. Model (Classiﬁcation Error)
fEU fEN fUE fUN fNE fNU
std(x) .088 .030 .083 .049 .087 .065
corr(x,Y ) −.91 .49 .92 .59 .90 −.91
corr(x,x−1) .68 .17 .73 .32 .73 .68
The two sets of model results are almost identical, except that the EN and NE transition
rates are slightly more cyclical and persistent. Note that in this exercise we have assumed
that classiﬁcation errors do not have a cyclical component. This is consistent with recent
work of Elsby, Hobijn, and S ¸ahin (2011).
A.4 Computation
The computation follows the algorithm which is brieﬂy summarized below and described
in more detail later subsequently.
1. Replace Ω by more limited information that can easily be kept track of. Here, we
choose the current aggregate capital stock K and the aggregate capital-labor ratio in
the previous period, M−1 ≡ K−1/L−1, as the information that the consumers use when
they make decisions.
2. The consumers have to forecast tomorrow’s aggregate capital K′ and also need to
calculate today’s aggregate capital-labor ratio M = K/L (to know the prices today).
51We use the following simple forecasting rules:
log(K′) = a0 + a1 log(K) + a2 log(z) + a3 log(M−1)
and
log(M) = b0 + b1 log(K) + b2 log(z) + b3 log(M−1).
At the ﬁrst iteration, make a guess for the values of a0, a1, a2, b0, b1, and b2.
3. Obtain the prices r and w from z and the forecasted M. Obtain T from w, K, and the
forecasted M. Solve the optimization problem of the consumers.
4. Simulate the economy using the decision rules of the consumers obtained above. In
particular, we can obtain the time series of K and M. Check whether the law of
motion for K′ and the forecasting rule for M guessed above are consistent with the
simulated values. That is, run a regression using the simulated data to see if the
coeﬃcients conjectured above are identical to the ones obtained from the regression
(also check the ﬁt of the regression). If they are diﬀerent, modify the coeﬃcients and
go back to the previous step. Repeat until the coeﬃcients have converged.
We ﬁnd that this procedure works well in our model, and the resulting forecasting rules are
remarkably accurate. This means that even if we add more information to each consumer’s
information set, the consumer cannot forecast much better.
In detail, the steps are as follows.
1. The aggregate information set Ω is restricted to a limited set of information. In par-
ticular, we limit the information to the current aggregate state Z, the current ag-
gregate capital stock K, and the aggregate capital-labor ratio in the previous period
52M−1 ≡ K−1/L−1. Then, the value functions can be rewritten as V (k,z,Z,K,M−1),
W(k,z,Z,K,M−1), and N(k,z,Z,K,M−1), where
V (k,z,Z,K,M−1) = max{W(k,z,Z,K,M−1),N(k,z,Z,K,M−1)}, (1)
and the Bellman equations for W and N are given by:
W(k,z,Z,K,M−1) =
maxc,k′ {log(c) − α
+βEz′,Z′′,M[(1 − σ(1 − λ))V (k′,z′,Z′,K′′,z′,Z′,K′,M)]
￿ (2)
s.t. c + k′ = r(Z,K,M−1)k + (1 − τ)w(Z,K,M−1)z + (1 − δ)k + T(Z,K,M−1)
c ≥ 0, k′ ≥ 0
and
N(k,z,Z,K,M−1) =
maxc,k′{log(c) + βEz′,Z′,K′,M[λV (k′,z′,Z′,K′′,z′,Z′,K′,M)]}
(3)
s.t. c + k′ = r(Z,K,M−1)k + (1 − δ)k + T(Z,K,M−1)
c ≥ 0, k′ ≥ 0.
2. In order to calculate the right hand sides of the Bellman equations (2) and (3), the
consumer has to be able to see the prices today and form an expectations on the future
aggregate state variables. We adopt a log-linear forecasting rules:
log(K′) = a0 + a1 log(K) + a2 log(Z) + a3 log(M−1) (4)
53and
log(M) = b0 + b1 log(K) + b2 log(Z) + b3 log(M−1). (5)
At the ﬁrst iteration, we make a guess for the values of a0, a1, a2, b0, b1, and b2.
3. We discretize the state space. For the aggregate shocks, the vector (Z,λ,σ) can take
two possible sets of values—these values vary with experiments, and are detailed in the
main text. z is discretized into 20 points. The grids are equally spaced in terms of
log(z), from the minimum of two standard deviations below the mean and the maximum
of two standard deviations above the mean. The individual asset has 48 grids for the
purpose of the individual optimization, ranging from 0 to 1440 (the average capital
holding is 183.7). The grids are (smoothly but) unequally spaced so that there are
more grids on the smaller side of k (this is because there is more curvature in the value
functions around the smaller values of k). We set 5 equally spaced grids on K (ranging
from 160 to 200 for the benchmark) and 5 equally spaced grids on M−1 (ranging from
145 to 185 for the benchmark).
For each aggregate state (and using (5), the prices and the transfer can be calculated
as
r = θZMθ−1,






Then we perform the optimization at each grid point and iterate over the value functions
in order to solve the Bellman equations (2) and (3). Along K′ and M directions, the
value functions are interpolated using a polynomial interpolation where necessary. A
54linear interpolation is used in k′ direction. We start from the guesses on V and N
functions, then obtain the new W function and the new N function from the right
hand sides of (2) and (3), and then obtain the new V function from (1). We search
for optimal asset decision globally using golden section search. We use global method
without diﬀerentiation (with linear interpolation) because of potential nonconcavity
and nondiﬀerentiability due to the discrete labor-leisure choice.
4. Once the Bellman equations are solved (and we have the value functions and the policy
functions for the asset choice), we simulate the economy. In particular, we draw 5000
periods of the aggregate shocks, start from the stationary distribution of (asset, produc-
tivity, employment) in the steady state model, and iterate over the density functions.
For this simulation, we increase the number of grids in k direction to 12001. (The
policy functions are linearly interpolated in k direction. For K and M−1 directions,
polynomial interpolations are used where necessary.)
The detail of the simulation is as follows. We have a mass of consumers on a partic-
ular grid of (asset, productivity, employment). Given the current aggregate state, we
know how this mass is divided and moved into the next period (asset, productivity,
employment) grids, given the policy functions and the transition probabilities.
Two details to note here—for the asset direction, since the decision rules are continuous,
most likely k′ won’t fall on the exact grid point. We divide the mass linearly in that
case—if the decision rule says that k′ for a particular (asset, productivity, employment)
combination would be 0.3kn + 0.7kn+1 (where n is the index of the grid point), then
we allocate 30% of people on kn and 70% of people on kn+1 in the next period. For the
employment direction, we have to decide whether the people who moved to a particular
(asset, productivity, employment) would work or not in the next period in the cases
55where they have a choice. This can simply be done by comparing W and N next period
at each grid points, given the next period aggregate state. One drawback of this simple
method is that the employment distribution will be the same between the case where
(Wn > Nn,Wn+1 ≪ Nn+1) and (Wn ≫ Nn,Wn+1 < Nn+1) (where the subscript is
the grid index of k′ where the value function is evaluated), and the labor supply can
potentially jump with a small change in environment if the threshold value crosses a
grid point. In order to “smooth out” this eﬀect, we linearly interpolate the employment
decision based on the distances of the value functions at each grid points. In eﬀect, we
are supposing that consumers are distributed uniformly between kn+1 and kn instead
of having a mass at kn (except at the maximum grid point) and approximating the
value function by linear interpolation in between these grids.22
Once the simulation is done, we have a time series of (Z,K,M−1). Using this time series
(discarding the ﬁrst 1000 periods), we run OLS regressions (4) and (5). We repeat the
same steps until the coeﬃcients converge.
The converged forecasting equations are
log(K′) = 0.050234 +1.004265log(K)+0.000514log(Z)−0.014181log(M−1),R2 = 0.999998
and
log(M) = −0.147328+0.280710log(K)−0.070561log(Z)+0.742800log(M−1),R2 = 0.990492
for the experiment with only frictions (ZG = 1.016 and ZB = 0.984 are used for the purpose
22This smoothing method introduces a small downward bias in the level of labor supply, but this eﬀect
is negligible given the large number of grids. We cross-checked with the simulation with a large number of
individuals and the behavior of aggregate variables is almost identical. Clearly one can use a more elaborated
method of adjustment, but we choose this method due to its simplicity.
56of these forecasting rules),
log(K′) = 0.064087 +0.991358log(K)+0.027667log(Z)−0.003739log(M−1),R2 = 1.000000
and
log(M) = −0.658345+0.828787log(K)−0.276471log(Z)+0.284357log(M−1),R2 = 0.998948
for the case of Z only, and
log(K′) = 0.061413 +0.993660log(K)+0.028053log(Z)−0.005560log(M−1),R2 = 1.000000
and
log(M) = −0.558708+0.745101log(K)−0.326600log(Z)+0.350141log(M−1),R2 = 0.999771
for the benchmark case.
Once all above is done, we simulate many consumers to obtain the statistics of interest.
(In this simulation, we do not need any interpolation for the next period employment—we
simply compare the value function.) We simulate 100,000 people to obtain the statistics of
the tables. For the “impulse response” diagrams, we simulate 10,000,000 people.
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